“Euthyphro’s Dilemma”

Morality — the human ability to appreciate the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil — has always posed a problem for atheist philosophers and evolutionary theorists. If there is no God, where does our moral consciousness come from? Why would such a quality, which has no “survival of the fittest” benefit, evolve naturally, especially given that no other living creature possesses a similar characteristic?

Atheists often attempt to sidestep the challenge of explaining morality by throwing back at the believer what is commonly called Euthyphro’s dilemma. Originally found in the writings of Plato, the dilemma arises from a conversation between the Greek philosopher Socrates and a student named Euthyphro. Socrates posed a question that stumped the younger man completely: Is a thing good just because the gods say it is, or do the gods call a thing good because it possesses some quality of goodness which the gods themselves are compelled to accept and acknowledge?

The most prominent atheist writer of modern times, Bertrand Russell, hurled this conundrum as a swipe at the logical consistency of Christianity. In his book, Why I Am Not a Christian, Russell wrote:

“If you are quite sure there is a difference between right and wrong, you are then in this situation: Is that difference due to God’s fiat or is it not?If it is due to God’s fiat, then for God Himself there is no difference between right and wrong, and it is no longer a significant statement to say that God is good.If you are going to say, as theologians do, that God is good, you must then say that right and wrong have some meaning which is independent of God’s fiat, because God’s fiats are good and not good independently of the mere fact that he made them. If you are going to say that, you will then have to say that it is not only through God that right and wrong came into being, but that they are in their essence logically anterior to God.”

It’s easy to see why this question is so appealing to the atheist. If “good” is good only because God says so, then goodness has no meaning — God could take what is “evil” today and pronounce it “good” tomorrow, if He chose. On the other hand, if God is powerless to determine what is “good” or “evil” in and of Himself, but is instead subject to some standard outside His control, can He really be considered an almighty and sovereign God? If there is a definition of “good” God can’t change, who wrote it?

The Christian’s reply to Euthyphro’s dilemma really isn’t difficult to reach, because the dilemma itself is flawed. The two options Socrates offered aren’t the only two possibilities. In fact, the truth is that good and evil are objective qualities, not “moving targets” based on a constantly-changing Divine mind. The definition, however, is not outside of God, but innate to His nature. Good and evil are defined not because God woke up one morning and arbitrarily decided some things are good and others evil, but rather because those things that are in accord with God’s character and nature He calls good, and those which are contrary to His nature He calls evil. The distinction between good and evil exists, therefore, not because God defined it on a whim, but because it is God-defined — that is, it is based on the nature of God, as the ultimate standard.

Deep down, the atheist knows this. His disbelief in God is rooted in rebellious self-will, not in an insufficiency of plain, coherent evidence (Romans 1:18-23). The atheist must admit that his own consciousness of morality is innate. We don’t really have to be taught that some things are right and others are wrong — we understand that almost automatically once we begin to mature. We only have to be taught which things are right and which are wrong, and that’s why we have God’s word (Hebrews 5:12-14; Romans 7:7-13; 2 Timothy 3:16-17; 2 Peter 1:3).

Michael D. Rankins, “The Lord’s Day,” November 9, 2003

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